Introduction
Social media have progressively become a popular open forum for analysing economic/financial topics and a field where the public sentiment is reflected in real time. Lagarde had approximately 232,000 Twitter followers. Further, "hot" economic topics like the Eurozone crisis and the Greek debt crisis are covered and discussed in great detail by dedicated websites (for instance in the The Wall Street Journal and The Financial Times). It has been argued that this "storehouse" of precious information might be contributing to the explanation of upcoming movements in financial markets.
Smith (2012) finds evidence for this in currency markets. Da et al. (2011) and Joseph et al. (2011) find evidence that online search activity predicts price movements in the (very liquid) U.S. equity markets. Even in the less liquid environment of residential home sales, Beracha and Wintoki (2013) find that online search activity predicts price changes. In motivating why an increase (or decrease) in the volume of search intensity predicts changes in asset prices in one direction, Joseph et al. (2011) and Beracha and Wintoki (2013) argue that, behaviourally, buyers are more likely to use search engines before making stock or residential real estate purchases than are sellers who already hold the assets and do not need to "search", and as such, one should expect a positive relationship between the prices of those assets and search intensity.
The importance of online search activity has received the attention of the financial press. On April 18 th 2013, Financial Times commentator Gillian Tett noted that investors can track investment returns with growing precision by plugging into social media. 1 A recent fake tweet reflects the power of social media and the cost of inaccurate information in an era where the speed at which information travels is unprecedented. 2 In fact, it has been suggested that financial markets are more influenced by negative press rumors than by fundamentals (see Hasan et al., 2013) .
1 Gillian Tett on "Markets Insight: Wake up to the Twitter effect on markets", The Financial Times, April 18, 2013. 2 A fake tweet on April 23 rd 2013 from a hacked Associated Press account (asserting that explosions at the White House had injured Barack Obama) wiped more than $130 billion off the value of the S&P 500 (The Economist; see http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576671-hacked-tweet-brieflyunnerves-stockmarket-newscrashrecover. Date accessed: Tuesday 4 November 2014).
Our paper focuses on the determinants of the sovereign cost of borrowing. Being one of the largest capital markets, 3 the sovereign bond market has important implications for the ability of a sovereign as well as the private sector to manage effectively their borrowing needs. Rapidly rising government bond yields add to the burden a country faces to borrow in international markets and therefore undermine its ability to roll existing debt over at a low cost. The fact that the country has to roll its debt over at high interest rates worsens its fiscal prospects, making default more likely. In this sense, the crisis of confidence can become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" (see e.g. Krugman, 2011) . At the same time, higher sovereign borrowing costs translate into higher corporate borrowing costs through the sovereign risk effect. For instance, Aguiar et al. (2009) and Aguiar and Amador (2011) note that a rise in sovereign debt increases the risk of higher future corporate taxes or the expropriation of private investments at the same time while reducing the ability of the government to offer implicit guarantees to the private sector. Ağca and Celasun (2012) note that since both corporate and sovereign debts are subject to the same country-specific macroeconomic risk factors, creditors seeking portfolio diversification would handle their overall exposure to a given country irrespectively of whether lending is channeled to the public or the private sector.
Consequently, a rise in government debt pushes corporate borrowing costs higher.
Indeed, Ağca and Celasun (2012) find that an increase in sovereign debt by one standard deviation from its mean is associated with 9% higher loan yield spreads in emerging markets. Using data on 118 non-financial companies in the Eurozone area over the 2008 period, Bedendo and Colla (2013 identify significant spillover effects from the sovereign to the corporate segment; according to their estimates, 1% increase in sovereign risk translates into a 50 basis points increase in corporate credit risk. According to a special report by Deutsche Bank (2013) , the higher cost of sovereign cost of borrowing is indeed felt by small and medium-sizes enterprises (SMEs) in Eurozone's periphery. The report estimates the average interest rate on loans to "sole proprietors and unincorporated partnerships" (a proxy for small and medium-sized enterprises) in
Italy/Spain at 300 to 400 basis points above the German level.
Given the importance of the sovereign debt market for both the public and private sector, the focus of our paper is on the impact of the volume of activity in social media The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 of the paper discusses the implemented methodology. Section 3 reviews briefly the determinants of sovereign spreads and discusses the dataset used in this paper. Section 4 reports our empirical results. Finally, Section 5 discusses our findings and offers suggestions for future research.
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Methodology
Consider the structural bivariate system 
1 c is positive 7 element of the 
Thus, the null hypothesis is equivalent to the following set of restrictions: 
To assess the validity of (5) 
Data issues and determinants of sovereign spreads
As discussed in the Introduction, to ensure that web search intensity is linked to rising spreads, it is important to select a sample period where released (and related to the Greek case) news disclose predominantly negative information. To determine a period with such a physiognomy in a justifiable way, we utilize as a "guide" the search intensity for news in the Google trends facility. Initially, we select two composite keywords, "Greece crisis" and "Greek debt crisis". 10 Substantial search intensity for the above keywords can determine candidate periods for investigation. At a second stage, in order to ensure that the events taking place during the determined periods communicate principally bad news, we backdate and examine all major events connected to the Greek crisis. Once we confirm that the period is deluged by bad news, we may then argue with reasonable confidence that the realized search intensity for the specific sample is connected to rising spreads. By entering the above criteria in Google trends facility and focusing on the search intensity for news and headlines, two candidate periods are determined: (i) from To select a cluster of queries capable of capturing the web search interest that is directly related to the Greek debt crisis, it is essential to identify a key-phrase that explicitly describes the subject of interest. Naturally, we choose as a suitable key-phrase the expression "Greek debt crisis". Armed with that key-phrase, Google trends suggests analogous queries classifying them in terms of relevance (the relevance index receives values from 0 to 100). Based on these suggestions, we select all top queries (with relevance index>90) as directly related searches to the topic of our interest.
11 The recommended queries are: "Greece debt crisis", "Greece debt", "the Greek crisis" and "Greece crisis".
12, 13
Furthermore, special care must be given to the treatment of the search operators.
For instance, by querying "Greece debt", the results may embody supplementary related terms (e.g. "Greece debt crisis") apart from the inclusion of "Greece" and "debt"(in any sequence). Given a set of queries, overlapping may be a severe threat (e.g. the query "Greece debt" may contain the search phrase "Greece debt crisis"). To overcome this concern, all queries are enclosed in quotation marks so only the exact term is used. The usage of quotation marks indirectly permits us to minimize the "contamination" of the t G index by search queries which are related to incidences of positive news. The indirect obstruction of search intensity related to good incidents, is taking place through the exclusion of terms that can alter the physiognomy of the search query. For example, the phrase "Greece debt" signifies predominantly search intensity for bad news while the phrase "Greece debt deal" suggests mostly search intensity for good news. Thus, for the extraction of the t G index, the search is specified as follows: "Greek debt crisis"+"Greece debt crisis"+"Greece debt"+"the Greek crisis"+"Greece crisis". The selected geographic area is worldwide and the language used is English. 14 11 All the subsequent top queries (apart from those selected) illustrate relevance index below or equal to 35. 12 To confirm the validity of the proposed queries, we also make use of an additional Google facility, namely Google correlate. Given that the facility does not offer correlated searches on a global basis, we seek similar queries for the key-phrase "Greek debt crisis" in the US, Canada and UK. The results reveal that the initially proposed queries indeed belong into the top 10 most related searches for all examined countries. 13 The G t index is available at a weekly frequency; we convert the series to daily frequency using the quadratic-match average method. 14 Undeniably, a more complete treatment demands integration of the related web search activity which is conducted in other European languages (notably because different exposure on Greek debt of the banking sector exists in different countries). As a result, we try to identify web search activity for the translated term "greek debt crisis" in six different languages, namely German (griechische schuldenkrise), French (crise de la dette grecque), Italian (crisi del debito greco), Spanish (crisis de la deuda griega), Greek (ελληνική κρίση χρέους) and Portuguese (crise da dívida grega). For every translated phrase, the Google trends facility indicates not enough search volume in order to deliver data. This may be attributed to the fact that (i) the prevailing language in the web is English and (ii) the majority of web users from these countries have knowledge of the English language and are therefore able to execute Google searches in English.
We note that for a selected key-phrase or a group of key-phrases, Google trends does not deliver the exact volume of queries but rather a normalized index of search intensity. The normalization is conducted as follows: the search volume associated to the query of interest V q t for a given time unit (day, week or month) is expressed as a fraction . To allow direct comparison (apples-to-apples) with the respective Google trends data, the sample size for our analysis is determined based on the Google trends search intensity index for the key-word "Grexit". Therefore, the sample period extends from 04/5/2012 to 21/3/2013 (220 observations).
15 Figure 3 plots jointly for the Twitter, Facebook and Google blogs the total number of mentions (henceforth, t T ) for the keyword "#Grexit". The Twitter (Facebook) data refer to the total number of users mentioning in their tweets (posts) the key-word "#Grexit", including also re-tweets (reposts). Similarly, the Google blogs data refer to the total number of users mentioning the keyword "#Grexit". Finally, the selected geographic area is worldwide and the dataset includes tweets or posts that can be in any language.
Empirical studies that focus on the determinants of sovereign yield spreads introduce a wide range of explanatory variables. These are classified into two broad categories: international factors and idiosyncratic factors (see Oliveira et al. 2012; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010) . Commonly used international factors include: (i) the international risk aversion level captured by the implied volatility of the S&P 500 -VIX index (Beber et al. 2009; Gerlach et al. 2010; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012) or by the difference between the US corporate bonds yield and the 10-year US sovereign bonds yield (Codogno et al. 2003) , (ii) global liquidity conditions proxied by the TED spread (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010) or by the US Federal Funds Rate (Csonto and Ivaschenko, 2013) , and (iii) the global cost of capital proxied by the US bond yields (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Maltritz, 2012) . Frequently implemented idiosyncratic factors refer to macroeconomic variables capturing the country's macroeconomic fundamentals as well as its overall credit risk rating (or probability of default) and liquidity risk (market size and depth). Macroeconomic variables include (amongst others) the debt-to-GDP ratio (Pagano and Von Thadden, 2004) , the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio (Schuknecht et al., 2009) , the current account balance (Heinz and Sun, 2014), the inflation rate (Lemmen and Goodhart, 1999) , the short-term interest rate (Schuknecht et al., 2009) , the credit rating (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2007) or probability of default (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010) . The role of liquidity risk, frequently measured by the bid-ask spread differential, is recognized by several studies as limited (Geyer et al., 2004; Favero et al., 2010) . Nevertheless, lack of attention towards liquidity risk has been cited by the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Eric Rosengren (2010) as one of the reasons explaining why the seriousness of the recent financial crisis was underestimated by economic forecasters; in fact, liquidity considerations have become a central issue in the literature only recently (see e.g. Angelini et al., 2011; Naes et al., 2011) .
Failure to account for factors that are crucial in shaping sovereign spreads and, at the same time, may also impact on the online search intensity and social media activity, could provide misleading causality inferences. Therefore, we condition upon a set of relevant variables. In particular, we use two international factors that capture Eurozone and global risk and two idiosyncratic factors that capture country-specific default risk (also reflecting country-specific macroeconomic position) and country-specific liquidity risk. On top of these factors, and given our interest in web activity, we extend previous work by accounting for the effects of web-traced information.
For the sovereign spreads and their determinants discussed above we use daily time-series data over the period 20/5/2011 to 09/5/2013. The sovereign spread ( jt S )
between the 10-year government bond yield in Eurozone peripheral country j ( j = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, France and the Netherlands) and the German government bond yield is available from Datastream; see Figure 4 . 16, 17 We proxy the default risk ( jt D ) by the difference between the 10-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia in country j and the 10-year German CDS premia (available from Datastream; see Figure 5 ). 18 We proxy liquidity risk ( jt L ; see Figure 6 ) using the differential between the bid-ask spread of the 10-year bond in country j and the bid-ask spread of the 10-year German bond (see e.g. Favero et al., 2010 ). Following De Santis (2014 , 2012 and Schwarz (2014) , we also use (from Bloomberg) the spread between the 10-year KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) bond yield and the 10-year German government bond yield as a proxy for the Eurozone area common risk factor ( t E ); see Figure 6 . KfW are German agency bonds. These bonds are less liquid than the federal government ones; however, KfW bonds carry the same default risk as they are fully guaranteed by the German federal government. Therefore, any difference should reflect "flight-to-liquidity" and "flight-to-safety" considerations.
We follow Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) 17 GARCH effects might be present in the sovereign spreads (Figure 4 ). Bodart and Candelon (2009) demonstrate that the B&C test is not sensitive to the presence of volatility clustering.
18 To proxy the default risk of Greece, we use the difference between the equally weighted sum of the 10-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia for two major Greek banks (Alpha Bank and National Bank of Greece) and the 10-year German CDS premia. Greek debt restructuring (in February 2012) triggered the payment of Greek CDS in March 2012. Since then, these series has been discontinued. For this reason, we use the CDS information on Greece's two major banks which are positively correlated (0.58) with the Greek CDS.
19 FSI is available at a weekly frequency; we convert the series to daily frequency using the quadratic-match average method.
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Empirical results
Using the B&C test, we disentangle short-and long-run predictability among the variables of interest. T ) can be characterized at first glance as puzzling. Such evidence may be puzzling if we assume homogeneous profile (in terms of education and capacity to comprehend economic topics) for the users of both data sources. Provided that Google is used by a wide range of users, a small fraction of those is anticipated to comply with the profile described above and therefore their impact on search intensity due to the evolution of spreads is expected to be rather small. On the other hand, Twitter users (the number of "#Grexit" mentions primarily comes from Twitter) are more educated relative to Google users (Mitchell et al., 2012) , implying that we expect a larger fraction of users to meet the profile described above. It appears that, for the case of Greece, the size of the fraction of users meeting the profile above is large enough to verify causality from spreads towards the number of "#Grexit" mentions.
20
Figures 12-19 report our findings for the remaining GIIPS whereas a summary of all results for the GIIPS is reported in Table 1 . For the t G index we find credible evidence of predictability mainly for Ireland (Figure 12 ) and to a much lesser extent for Italy (Figure 13 ), while no predictability is confirmed for Portugal ( Figure 14) and Spain ( Figure 15 (Figure 17 ), Portugal ( Figure 18 ) and Spain (Figure 19 ), a common pattern is revealed, since predictability in high frequencies is verified only when the conditioning vector includes the t FSI variable. For Italy and Spain, evidence of predictability exists for wave lengths between 2.21 and 2.41 days and between 2.32 and 2.53 days, respectively. Finally, for Portugal predictability occurs for wave lengths between 2.26 and 2.80 days and between 4.72 and 5.02 days. In any other case, no significant causality occurs for the entire range of frequencies (see Table 1 for a summary).
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A point of caution is that we cannot compare directly for each country the causality results for t G with those of t T , since the construction of these two indexes is based on a different set of key-words/key-phrases (multiple key-phrases for t G and a single key-word for t T ). To execute apples-to-apples comparison, we need to isolate the same key-word ("Grexit" in our case) from both sources of data and for the same time period. By conducting the above exercise for a sample size that coincides with the period in which significant search volume exists in Google Trends for the key-word "Grexit" (see Section 3), we may argue that the two different sources of data result to qualitative similar causality inference. In particular, no causality exists for Italy, Portugal and Spain while significant causality in relatively high frequencies is established for Greece and Ireland. The identified causality for both countries is clearly more pronounced for the t T index. . It goes without saying that these results should be treated with caution. Ireland, whose economic share in the Eurozone output is smaller than that of Greece was the second peripheral country (after Greece) to be bailed-out. Arguably then, bad news circulated via online activity is more likely to impact negatively on smaller 21 Given our interest in GIIPS, and following a reviewer's suggestion, we re-conducted the entire empirical part of the paper (without conditioning) by constructing a new search intensity index which has as a starting point the key-phrase "euro crisis". Adopting the same sample period, the request, which has been performed in the Google trends facility for the formation of the index, is the following: "euro crisis"+"the euro crisis"+"euro debt"+"euro debt crisis"+"euro in crisis". The derived results revealed that swapping the term Greece (or Greek) with the term Euro does not appear to increase, in any significant way, the predictive power of the search intensity index with respect to the spreads for the GIIPS. Detailed results are available upon request. 22 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. The results are available upon request. In addition, exposure of banks in peripheral countries to Greek public and private debt might also explain why there is some evidence of predictability for the GIIPS.
Indeed, Bank of International Settlements (BIS) data showed that in June 2011, 24 Portuguese banks had some $10.08bn exposure (or 6.73% of their total exposure around the world) followed by a $3.88bn exposure (or 0.40% of total exposure) for Italian banks, $0.77bn (or 0.21% of total exposure) for Irish banks and $1.22bn (or 0.1% of total exposure) for Spanish banks. Following the Greek debt restructuring, the exposure to Greek debt was reduced; yet, Portuguese banks, followed by Italian banks, remained more exposed to Greek debt than the others. According to the latest BIS data (published in June 2013), the exposure of Portuguese banks to Greek debt had dropped, in December 2012, to $7.34bn (or 6.16% of their total exposure around the world). The exposure of Italian banks to Greek debt had dropped to $1.0bn (or 0.12% of total exposure), for the Irish banks to $0.11bn (or 0.07% of total exposure) and for the Spanish banks to $0.76bn (or 0.05% of total exposure). This argument is in line with the evidence of Mink and de Haan (2013) who rely on an event study approach and employ daily data to identify significant effects of news about the Greek bailout on stock price returns in European banks (irrespective of their exposure to the remaining GIPS; the definition of Mink and De Haan excludes Italy). They also find that that news about the Greek economic situation and the Greek bailout has led to abnormal returns on sovereign bonds for the GIPS with a larger impact in the case of Portugal and a lower impact in the case of Ireland and Spain.
To sum up, we show that Greek debt crisis related information in social media and Google search queries does influence financial markets. This is mainly so for Greece and Ireland, and to a much lesser extent for Italy, Portugal and Spain. This could be viewed as a weak signal of contagion from Greece to (some of) the remaining GIIPS in the sense that social media discussion and Google search queries related to the Greek debt crisis carry some predictive information for the cost of borrowing in other peripheral Eurozone economies. Noting that economists disagree on the definition of contagion and how it can be empirically tested (see Corsetti et al., 2011) , our Greek-crisis related variables ( t G and t T ) arguably comply with the thinking of Mink and de Haan (2013) who refer to contagion in terms of country-specific events and their impact on the asset prices of other countries.
Given that the data used in our case are unwrought, further qualitative elaboration may be of fathomless importance in revealing more clearly the true linkage between Greek-crisis related social media/Google search queries and GIIPS spreads. With this in mind, our work, which relies on the B&C test, differs from recent work by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) who use monthly data to identify contagion effects in terms of a significant direct and positive effect from the Greek spread on other Eurozone sovereign spreads and more so for the remaining GIIPS (with the effect being stronger for Ireland and Portugal), or recent work by De Santis (2012) who identifies contagion effects in terms of the direct impact of a Greek credit rating downgrade on other Eurozone sovereign spreads (the impact is again stronger for Portugal and Ireland). Our work also differs from Beetsma et al. (2013) who construct macroeconomic/financial news variables about the GIIPS (using information from the newsflash of Eurointelligence; an independent internet-based service which provides daily morning Euro-area news briefings of the European media) to conclude that bad news has increased sovereign yield differentials in the GIIPS and has triggered spillover effects to non-GIIPS countries. Finally, we also note the work of Di Cesare et al. (2013) who argue that recent movements in Eurozone spread differentials have increased to levels above those justified by economic fundamentals. Di Cesare et al. (2013) construct a monthly index of search volume of Euro break-up keywords ("end of Euro", "end of the Euro", "Euro break-up", "Euro break") and note that this index has a strong positive correlation of 0.77 with the residual part of the 10-year Italian spread, that is, the part not explained by economic fundamentals (such as the deficit-to-GDP ratio, expected growth, the volatility of stocks in the banking sector and the volatility of the Italian spread).
Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper examines the long and short-run causality between Google search queries and social media data related to the Greek debt crisis and sovereign spreads in the GIIPS. We have five main findings. First, we identify short-run causality from social media and Google search queries data to the Greek and Irish spreads. Our evidence remains strong even when a number of financial controls are accounted for. This might be due to the fact that spreads, social media/Google search queries and controls are all driven by the same unknown underlying process (for instance, expectations could play an important role). Second, there is evidence of short-run causality running from the Greek spread to social media discussion. This finding remains robust even when conditioning takes place.
Third, there is some weak (and information-set sensitive) evidence of predictability of Greek-debt related social media discussion and Google search queries for Portuguese, Italian and Spanish spreads. Fourth, t G carries different short-run predictive information relative to t T . Although Google is used by a wider base, social media (especially Twitter) have become a very popular way of keeping track of news and directing "followers" to news analysis (e.g. in blogs) in an extremely speedy way; this might explain why t T provides more pronounced evidence of short-run predictability for all the examined Eurozone peripheral countries in comparison to t G . Fifth, the borrowing costs in a set of Eurozone's core countries (in this case France and the Netherlands) remained immune to social media/Google queries information related to the Greek crisis.
A frequently made assumption is that the relationship between information demand and risk aversion is a positive one (see for instance Eeckhoudt and Godfroid 2000). Although opposite views to the latter have been expressed, in this paper we focus on social media attention for the Greek crisis in terms of negative news 25 which drive up spreads on the grounds that it reflects increased concerns about Greek debt sustainability and the future of the Eurozone. We therefore argue that social media information carries important predictive information for the bond market in periods characterised by negative economic news when traditional models that use only financial controls variables might prove inadequate. Given the very speedy way with which social media information is spread, our results arguably hint that social media information plays a vital role towards strengthening the efficient character of financial markets.
The evidence we provide implicitly assumes the following order: increased social media activity (in terms of bad news) implies higher risk which, in turn, results in a higher spread. 26 This very issue is arguably a hostage to fortune. Indeed, it suggests that the 20 more policymakers talk about the Greek debt crisis, and hence the more the social media refer to it, the more spreads will rise.
27
Our paper looks at the contribution from information contained in social media towards predicting sovereign spreads, as opposed to the contribution of social media itself. The latter question would however be intellectually interesting: how much mileage do we get from considering social media data in addition to more traditional measures of news intensity (e.g. number of related articles published that day). Indeed, it would be interesting to repeat the exercise conditioning on traditional news intensity measures once such measures will be easily and readily available. In that regard, the frequency of data (daily) we consider is somewhat limiting, as one of the points of a medium like
Twitter is ultra-fast communication of very fresh news, and it would be interesting to explore higher frequency impacts, if any. We leave this issue for future research.
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Overall, our empirical results suggest that unwrought data, effortlessly traced in social media, enclose valuable information content with respect to the short-run movements of financial markets. We do not argue that the intensity of searches or the number of mentions for a particular term is comparable to a sentiment index; rather, we flag the issue that it offers unexploited information which can be further utilized for improving our understanding of financial markets.
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, where Ask and Bid refer to the Ask and Bid price of the 10-year government bond. Figure 8 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using VIX is 8 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 9 the VAR lag length is 13 in every case. The grey area indicates joint statistical significance of the three plotted measures. Note: In Figure 10 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using VIX is 8 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 11 the VAR lag length is 14, 13 and 13, respectively. Note: In Figure 14 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using VIX is 6 in every case.. Similarly, in Figure 15 the VAR lag length is 7 in every case. Note: In Figures 16-17 , the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using VIX is 13 in every case. The grey area indicates joint statistical significance of the three plotted measures. Note: In Figure 18 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using VIX is 13 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 19 the VAR lag length is 12 in every case. Figures 20-21 , the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using VIX is 7 in every case. Note: In Figure 22 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya's conditioning using VIX is 4 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 23 the VAR lag length is 4,4 and 3, respectively.
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